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Abstract 
This paper focuses on China’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI), arguably one of the 
most prominent forms of ‘new’ capital entering the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) in recent times, not least since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced by 
Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. Despite initial warmth and hopes for Chinese capital to 
uplift the economies of the region, recent years have witnessed some high profile pushback 
against China by some ASEAN members. Key concerns include but are not limited to new, 
often project-related concerns as well as old, if unspoken, fears that ‘China is buying the world’ 
through a spate of ‘debt trap diplomacy’. This paper aims to shed light on this issue, focusing 
on China’s outward FDI into ASEAN. Through an analysis of statistical information, it shows 
that Chinese FDI in ASEAN economies is considerably ‘smaller’ than what popular rhetoric 
suggests. Firstly, Chinese outward FDI, while increasing in value, is not more significant than 
the region’s traditional investors, mainly Japan and ASEAN itself. Secondly, the quality of 
Chinese outward FDI is considerably less sophisticated and sustainable than what is commonly 
expected. Much of it is directed towards tertiary industries such as real estate activities, which 
contain a rather speculative element.  
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, China, Japan, ASEAN, Foreign Direct Investment, 
Regional Development 
 
1. Introduction 
China’s economic resurgence following its ‘Reform and Opening’ policies in 1978 has 
been nothing short of miraculous. While initially reliant on attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to power its growth, China has become a significant exporter of FDI, especially since 
the early 2000s. In 2017, China’s outward FDI totalled USD125 billion, making it the world’s 
third-largest source of FDI, trailing only the US (USD342 billion) and Japan (USD160 billion) 
(UNCTAD 2018). Chinese agency has also been reinforced since the 2013 announcement of 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious project to better connect China to regions 
spanning Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Europe, and Africa.  
Accompanying this economic prowess is constant discussion of Chinese outward FDI 
in the international arena, with fear and impartiality driving much of the dialogue. Reflecting 
his administration’s strict stance on China, US President Donald Trump in August 2018 signed 
 2 
a law to strengthen a panel that reviews investments from abroad for national security risks, 
widely viewed as a way to curtail Chinese FDI entering the US (Wells and Leonard 2018). In 
EU, wariness of China is similarly noticeable as lawmakers overwhelmingly backed a far-
reaching system in February 2019 to coordinate scrutiny of foreign investments, notably from 
China, to protect strategic technologies and infrastructure in Europe. Franck Proust, the leading 
EU lawmaker on the plan, said on the eve of the vote: ‘We’re not looking to bar foreign 
investment. It is essential for EU countries, we need it. It’s to pay attention to the investments 
that are strange, that do not make economic sense but are political’ (Reuters 2018). 
As China’s ‘near abroad’, with Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam sharing borders with 
Yunnan and Guangxi provinces, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
member states are bound to be on the receiving end of such overtures. Indeed, ASEAN has 
emerged as one of the most popular investment destinations for Chinese transnational 
corporations (TNCs) eager to expand their presence overseas (Lim 2017; Camba 2017). 
Nevertheless, initial warmth in the region has seemingly given way to (often) project-related 
worries as well as fears that ‘China is buying the world’ through a spate of ‘debt trap diplomacy’ 
(see Straits Times 2018; The Economist 2018). 1  For instance, Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad, in his visit to Beijing in August 2018 stressed that his recently-installed 
administration will have no choice but to cancel or shelf some of the large BRI projects pushed 
forward by his predecessor, Najib Razak. Explaining his rationale after meeting Premier Li 
Keqiang of China, Mahathir stated that: ‘We do not want a situation where there is a new 
version of colonialism happening because poor countries are unable to compete with rich 
countries’. 2  Perhaps appealing to Chinese sentiments, he also referred to the negative 
experience of the Chinese in signing unequal treaties with the Western powers in the aftermath 
of the opium wars during the 1800s: ‘China knows very well that it had to deal with unequal 
treaties in the past imposed upon China by Western powers… So China should be sympathetic 
toward us. They know we cannot afford this’ (TODAY 2018). In a similar vein, Chairul 
Tanjung, the sixth-richest man in Indonesia, in an international business forum held in Hong 
Kong in September 2017 stated that: ‘China now is very aggressive with its initiative… to 
come to all countries, including the ASEAN… but sometimes, if you're too aggressive coming 
without enough socialization – that will also make us [feel scared]’ (Ho 2017). 
                                                          
1 See Nolan (2012) for a more detailed, albeit slightly dated, discussion on this issue. 
2 Some of these projects are alleged to have had their cost grossly inflated and/or serve as conduits for 
which public money is siphoned to key individuals linked to the Najib clique (Reuters 2018).  
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Nevertheless, is there any truth behind such fearful sentiments? Is China, through its 
TNCs, really ‘buying up ASEAN’? To more accurately tackle this topic, the paper shall ask 
and answer three more surgical questions: What is the value of Chinese FDI entering ASEAN, 
especially vis-à-vis the region’s more established investors i.e. Japan and ASEAN itself? 
Where or which industries are the Chinese TNCs investing their capital into? Lastly, to what 
extent is Chinese FDI reshaping ASEAN’s economic progress? To unpack these questions, the 
paper shall analyse Chinese investment in ASEAN, focusing on two inter-related perspectives 
– quantity and quality of the FDI.  
As shall be elaborated in the subsequent sections, the main argument is that Chinese 
FDI in the ASEAN economies is considerably ‘smaller’ than what popular rhetoric suggests. 
Firstly, Chinese TNCs, despite a significant upsurge in their investment into the region, have 
not usurped their Japanese and ASEAN counterparts. The only clear case of Chinese success 
is in Laos, one of the region’s smallest and most backward economies. Secondly, there remain 
doubts about the quality of Chinese outward FDI in ASEAN. A large portion of Chinese capital 
has gone into real estate development, which offers not only limited linkages to the domestic 
population, but also encourages market speculation. Unlike the Japanese TNCs which invest 
primarily into manufacturing, Chinese TNCs’ lack of attention towards the manufacturing 
industry casts doubts on their embeddedness to the regional and domestic industrial ecosystem, 
hampering the latter’s long term growth in the region.  
Data on the flow of FDI was obtained from the statistical database of international and 
regional organizations such as the World Bank and ASEAN Secretariat.  It mainly draws upon 
statistical figures of the last five to 10 years, although older data has also proven useful. In 
addition, information related to the stock of FDI, where available, was retrieved from the year-
on-year balance of payment account of the respective ASEAN economies. Such information 
was obtained by accessing the database of CEIC Data Manager, the statistical boards, and 
central banks of the relevant ASEAN economies. 3  To enhance data consistency, the 
information gathered was cross validated with newspaper essays, published reports, academic 
and technical articles, and company websites in the English, Chinese, and several Southeast 
Asian languages (i.e. Malay and Indonesian). The use of these sources of information allowed 
for data verification and triangulation, resulting in a clearer reading of the situation from 
multiple perspectives.  
                                                          
3 Due to rounding, numbers presented throughout this paper may not add up precisely to the totals 
provided and percentages may not precisely reflect the absolute figures. 
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The paper begins by analysing the quantitative dimension of Chinese FDI, comparing 
it to FDI from ASEAN and Japan. The flow of FDI entering ASEAN – representing the short 
term dynamics – will be examined. Thereafter, the stock of FDI – representing the long term 
evolution of the regional business landscape – shall be analysed. The paper then focuses on the 
qualitative dimension of Chinese, ASEAN, and Japanese FDI, illustrating that a substantial 
percentage of Chinese FDI has entered the tertiary sector. The heavy emphasis of the Chinese 
TNCs on tertiary activities contrasts with that of the manufacturing-centric nature of FDI from 
Japan. The subsequent section discusses the paper’s findings. In addition, it offers prospective 
researchers some avenues to conduct more detailed analysis on this subject. The paper 
concludes with a summary of the main argument, along with some policy advice. 
 
2. Re-Interpreting Chinese Foreign Direct Investment into ASEAN  
2.1. Quantitative Dimension 
 Figure 1 shows that the flow of Chinese FDI into ASEAN has increased from 2010 to 
2017.4 Rising from a low of USD3.5 billion to USD11.4 billion during the period observed, the 
flow of Chinse FDI into the region has enjoyed slightly more than a tripling of value. 
Nevertheless, Chinese FDI remains a laggard vis-à-vis ASEAN and Japanese investors. 
ASEAN investors remain the largest FDI contributor in the region, contributing as much as 
USD27.0 billion in 2017. Apart from a brief drop in 2011, 2013, and 2015, ASEAN’s flow of 
FDI has steadily increased on an annual basis. On the other hand, Japanese FDI has fluctuated 
during the period observed, but it has hovered around the USD13.0 billion threshold since 2014. 
Despite the rather uneven and lacklustre performance of the Japanese investors, Chinese FDI 
still cannot usurp the former.  
                                                          
4 This paper acknowledges the fairly prominent role played by offshore business centers such as Hong 
Kong and the Netherlands in orchestrating investment into some economies within ASEAN. However, 
it is almost impossible to accurately estimate the FDI entering and exiting ASEAN through these 
destinations. A more practical solution, adopted in this paper, is to ‘isolate’ the monetary effects of 
these offshore business centers, removing them from the analysis.  
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Figure 1: Flow of Inward Foreign Direct Investment into ASEAN by Source Country, 
2010-2017 (Billion USD) 
Source: ASEANstats. 
 
Table 1 details the distribution of Chinese FDI into the respective ASEAN economies 
as well as that of ASEAN itself and Japan from 2010 to 2017. It can be seen that the top three 
economies targeted by Chinese TNCs are Singapore, Indonesia, and Myanmar respectively, 
witnessed by the increasing inflow of Chinese FDI. Nevertheless, Chinese TNCs have still 
failed to out-invest their ASEAN and Japanese counterparts in all three economies. Chinese 
performance is especially dismal in Indonesia, where it is close to fifteen and eight times 
smaller than the FDI contributed by ASEAN and Japanese TNCs respectively. In addition, a 
country-by-country analysis reveals that the flow of Chinese FDI is only decisively dominant 
in Laos, ASEAN’s second smallest economy. It is perhaps Laos’ small size and lack of 
integration to the rest of the region which makes it an ‘easy’ target for Chinese TNCs. For the 
rest of ASEAN, it is not apparent that Chinese FDI has significantly displaced that of ASEAN 
and/or Japan. For example, Indonesia and Thailand – ASEAN’s two largest economies – 
remain firm favourites for Japanese TNCs. Indeed, these are the two economies that absorb 
close to half of Japanese FDI into the region on a yearly basis. Even in Cambodia and Myanmar, 
two supposedly close Chinese allies, Chinese investors have not been able to corner the market 
in the manner they have in Laos. Although Chinese FDI outranks Japanese FDI in both these 
countries, it has not been able to out-invest ASEAN TNCs for the period observed. 
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Table 1: Flow of Inward Foreign Direct Investment into Various ASEAN Economies by 
Source Country, 2010-2017 (Billion USD) 
 Year 
Host 
Country 
Source 
Country 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Brunei ASEAN 0.1 0.1 0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.8 
China 0 - - - - - - - 0 
Japan 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
Cambodia ASEAN 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 3.4 
China  0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 3.2 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0.2 0.6 
Indonesia ASEAN 5.9 8.3 7.6 8.7 13.1 9.3 9.9 11.9 74.6 
China 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.3 0.4 1.8 5.1 
Japan 3.7 6.2 8.0 5.6 5.8 4.0 2.5 4.1 40.0 
Laos ASEAN 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 
China 0 0.3 - - 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.3 3.6 
Japan 0 0 - - 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 
Malaysia ASEAN 0.5 2.7 2.8 2.2 2.3 2.9 2.1 2.2 17.6 
China 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.4 1.6 3.7 
Japan 1.0 3.2 1.9 2.6 0.7 2.5 0.9 1.2 13.7 
Myanmar ASEAN 0 0.1 0.2 1.2 0.7 2.2 1.7 2.6 8.6 
China 1.5 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 4.4 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0.4 
Philippines ASEAN 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.7 1.6 
China 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.2 
Japan 0 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 2.7 0.1 4.4 
Singapore ASEAN 5.7 2.0 11.5 3.5 4.9 3.0 6.5 4.0 41.1 
China 0.7 5.5 6.0 2.7 3.6 4.0 6.0 4.5 33.0 
Japan 2.8 -1.8 -1.9 2.8 2.6 2.1 3.1 0.8 10.5 
Thailand ASEAN 2.2 1.0 -0.7 0.5 -0.9 0.4 2.0 1.8 6.3 
China 0.6 0 0.6 0.9 -0.2 0.2 1.1 0.1 3.4 
Japan 4.4 -1.4 3.7 11.0 2.4 3.0 3.0 3.3 29.3 
Vietnam  ASEAN 1.3 1.5 1.3 2.1 1.5 2.2 2.3 2.5 14.7 
China 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.9 4.0 
Japan 1.1 1.2 2.9 2.4 1.0 1.0 1.3 3.6 14.4 
Source: ASEANstats. 
 
The situation looks even less promising for the Chinese investors if the stock of FDI in 
the region is taken into consideration. Table 2 shows the FDI stock of the major investors in 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand between 2006 and 2017.5 Japanese investors hold an almost 
unassailable lead in Thailand, primarily because of the latter’s status as one of the traditional 
                                                          
5 Although data on stock of FDI is harder to retrieve on a consistent basis compared to flow of FDI, a 
‘snapshot’ analysis can still be conducted for Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. 
 7 
favourites for Japanese manufacturers investing into ASEAN. ASEAN investors, while not as 
prominent as their Japanese counterparts, have also grown their stock of FDI substantially. To 
this end, ASEAN’s stock of FDI in Thailand has almost tripled from USD13.2 billion to 
USD39.4 billion from 2006 to 2017. The stock of Chinese FDI in the country is considerably 
smaller than that of both Japan and ASEAN. Despite a strong growth rate, Chinese FDI stands 
only at USD4.7 billion in 2017.  
 
Table 2: Stock of Foreign Direct Investment in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand by 
Source Country, 2006-2017 (Billion USD) 
 Year 
Host 
Country 
Source 
Country 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Malaysia ASEAN 8.6 17.2 14.4 15.0 16.9 20.4 22.7 25.0 - 34.8 38.1 38.0 
China 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 - 1.1 3.1 5.2 
Japan 8.6 10.1 9.6 9.9 11.6 13.9 16.1 18.6 17.5 21.1 20.2 20.8 
Singapore ASEAN 8.7 11.6 13.5 16.6 22.9 23.4 30.3 30.2 30.8 32.5 36.3 40.3 
China  1.2 1.7 3.2 6.9 12.3 10.8 11.6 12.7 11.4 16.2 17.1 25.9 
Japan 32.1 34.0 36.0 36.1 40.0 40.0 43.0 51.6 78.6 82.3 66.3 71.4 
Thailand ASEAN 13.2 16.2 14.1 18.8 24.3 31.6 32.9 32.0 35.6 30.7 32.2 39.4 
China 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.3 1.9 2.6 3.5 3.3 3.2 4.6 4.7 
Japan 27.6 32.5 34.6 36.8 45.1 47.9 57.0 64.8 70.7 66.2 72.4 83.1 
1.0 USD: 3.8 MYR; 1.0 USD: 1.4 SGD 
Source: Department of Statistics (Malaysia), Department of Statistics (Singapore), Bank of 
Thailand, and CEIC Data Manager.  
 
A similar scenario is observed in both Malaysia and Singapore. Notwithstanding a high 
growth rate, the stock of Chinese FDI is still significantly smaller than that of ASEAN and 
Japan. For Malaysia, ASEAN’s stock of FDI is about seven times the size of the Chinese in 
2017. For Singapore, the stock of Japanese FDI amounts to USD71.4 billion in 2017, which is 
about threefold the value of the Chinese FDI stock. 
 
2.2. Qualitative Dimension 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the contrast in composition of the flow of Chinese, ASEAN, 
and Japanese FDI from 2012 to 2017. For China, its TNCs have mainly invested into the tertiary 
sector, led by real estate activities, financial and insurance activities, and wholesale and retail 
trade-cum-repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles. As much as 40% to 68% of Chinese 
outward FDI into ASEAN has gone into these three activities during the period observed. Out 
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of these three activities, real estate development is the most heavily represented, accounting 
for 21% to 34% of total Chinese outward FDI. It is widely believed that much of the Chinese 
FDI classified as real estate development entering ASEAN has gone into luxury projects that 
contain rather speculative elements, with little direct benefit to the local population.6 Indeed, 
China’s latest round of capital controls, implemented in March 2017, has been designed to stop 
Chinese companies from irrational foreign investment, with real estate, cultural, and 
entertainment top on Beijing’s list of scrutiny (Wang 2017). Contrarily, manufacturing-related 
FDI is relatively meagre in value, representing only an average of 11% of Chinese outward 
capital into ASEAN. 
For ASEAN, close to one-third of its FDI has financed manufacturing activities from 
2012 to 2017. The second most important activity financed by ASEAN TNCs is financial and 
insurance activities, contributing an average of 20% of ASEAN FDI – despite some fluctuation 
in value – during the period observed. ASEAN TNCs’ third most favourite activity is real estate 
activities, accounting for an average of 17% of their FDI during the period observed. 
Unlike Chinese and ASEAN FDI, a very high percentage of Japanese capital has gone 
towards manufacturing activities. Apart from 2012, 35% to 55% of Japanese FDI has financed 
manufacturing in ASEAN. The heavy presence of Japanese FDI in manufacturing reflects the 
resilience of Japan TNCs-orchestrated production networks and industrial organization. More 
importantly, Japanese manufacturers remain powerhouses in the region’s critical industries 
such as automobile and tools and machinery, pressing home the goodwill and brand name they 
built when they established production facilities in Southeast Asia en masse following the 1985 
Plaza Accord which led to the rapid rise in the value of Japanese Yen (JPY), otherwise known 
as endaka (literally translates to ‘expensive Yen’). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Some of the most commonly cited projects are Forest City (Malaysia) and Meikarta (Indonesia) (Ng 
and Lim 2017; Rose 2018). 
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Table 3: Sector-by-Sector Analysis of Flow of Inward Foreign Direct Investment into 
ASEAN by Chinese Investors, 2012-2017 (Billion USD, %) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Sector Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 0.1 (1%)  0.1 (1%) 0.1 (1%) 0.1 (1%) 0.1 (1%) 0.3 (2%) 
Mining and Quarrying 0.3 (4%) 0.6 (9%) 1.1 (18%) 0.3 (4%) 0.1 (1%) 0.6 (6%) 
Manufacturing -0.1 (-1%) 1.2 (19%) 0.7 (12%) 0.8 (12%) 1.1 (10%) 1.6 (14%) 
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air 
Conditioning supply 
0 (0%) 0.1 (1%) 0.4 (6%) 0.6 (8%) 0.5 (4%) 1.0 (8%) 
Water Supply; Sewerage, Waste 
Management and Remediation 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Construction 0.3 (3%) 0 (0%) 0.2 (3%)  0.1 (1%) 0.7 (6%) 0.7 (6%) 
Wholesale and Retail Trade-cum-
Repair of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles 
1.3 (17%) 0.9 (14%) 0.3 (4%) 0.6 (9%) 1.8 (16%) 2.8 (24%) 
Transportation and Storage 1.7 (22%) 0 (0%) -0.3 (-5%) 0.2 (3%) -0.1 (-1%) 0 (0%) 
Accommodation and Food Service 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.1 (1%) 1.0 (7%) -0.2 (-2%)  
Information and Communication 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.2 (1%) 
Financial and Insurance Activities 0.6 (7%) 0.1 (2%) 1.8 (29%) 1.7 (25%) 3.4 (31%) 1.6 (14%) 
Real Estate Activities 1.9 (24%) 1.6 (25%) 2.1 (34%) 2.0 (30%) 2.4 (21%) 3.1 (27%) 
Professional, Scientific and 
Technical Activities 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.1 (1%) 
Administrative and Support Service 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Education 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Human Health and Social Work 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Other Services Activities 1.4 (18%) 0.9 (14%) -0.3 (-5%) 0.3 (4%) 0.1 (1%) -0.2 (-2%) 
Unspecified Activity 0.5 (6%) 0.8 (13%) 0.1 (1%) 0.1 (2%) 0.2 (2%) 0 (0%) 
Total 8.0 (100%) 6.3 (100%) 6.3 (100%) 6.6 (100%) 11.3 (100%) 11.4 (100%) 
Source: ASEANstats. 
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Table 4: Sector-by-Sector Analysis of Flow of Inward Foreign Direct Investment into 
ASEAN by ASEAN Investors, 2012-2017 (Billion USD, %) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Sector Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 1.3 (6%) 1.6 (9%) 4.1 (18%) 4.1 (20%) 2.8 (11%) 4.3 (16%) 
Mining and Quarrying 0.6 (2%)  0.3 (2%) 1.3 (6%) 1.2 (6%) 1.2 (5%) 0.7 (3%) 
Manufacturing 5.4 (23%) 6.3 (34%) 6.1 (28%) 4.4 (21%) 6.6 (26%) 8.7 (32%) 
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air 
Conditioning supply 
0 (0%) 0.2 (1%) 0 (0%) 0.5 (2%) 0 (0%) 1.0 (3%) 
Water Supply; Sewerage, Waste 
Management and Remediation 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Construction 0.2 (1%) 0 (0%) 0.2 (1%) 0.3 (1%) 0 (0%) 0.6 (2%) 
Wholesale and Retail Trade-cum-
Repair of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles 
-1.1 (-5%) 0.5 (2%) 1.2 (5%) 1.3 (6%) 1.8 (7%) 2.5 (9%) 
Transportation and Storage 0.5 (2%) 0.2 (1%) 0.3 (1%) 0.4 (2%) 0.2 (1%) 0.3 (1%) 
Accommodation and Food Service 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.3 (1%) 0 (0%) 
Information and Communication 0.6 (3%) 0 (0%) 0.2 (1%) 0.8 (4%) 0.2 (1%) 1.3 (5%) 
Financial and Insurance Activities 9.8 (42%) 2.3 (12%) 4.7 (21%) 2.5 (12%) 5.4 (21%) 2.6 (10%) 
Real Estate Activities 4.3 (18%) 4.7 (25%) 4.9 (22%) 3.0 (14%) 3.5 (13%) 2.9 (11%) 
Professional, Scientific and 
Technical Activities 
0.2 (1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.1 (1%) 0.1 (1%) 
Administrative and Support Service 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0.1 (1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Public Administration and Defence; 
Compulsory Social Security 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Education 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Human Health and Social Work 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Other Services Activities 1.0 (4%) 1.0 (5%) -1.7 (-7%) 0.2 (1%) 1.4 (5%) 1.7 (6%) 
Unspecified Activity 0.4 (2%) 1.3 (7%) 0.7 (3%) 2.1 (10%) 2.0 (8%) 0 (0%) 
Total 23.4 (100%) 18.5 (100%) 22.3 (100%) 20.8 (100%) 25.9 (100%) 27.0 (100%) 
Source: ASEANstats. 
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Table 5: Sector-by-Sector Analysis of Flow of Inward Foreign Direct Investment into 
ASEAN by Japanese Investors, 2012-2017 (Billion USD, %) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Sector Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Value 
(Percentage) 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 0.1 (1%) 0 (0%) 0.1 (1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Mining and Quarrying 0.2 (1%) -0.3 (-1%) 0.7 (5%) 0.5 (4%) 0.6 (4%) 0.7 (5%) 
Manufacturing 2.6 (18%) 12.6 (51%) 6.6 (50%) 7.3 (55%) 4.8 (35%) 6.1 (45%) 
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air 
Conditioning supply 
0 (0%) 0.2 (1%) 0 (0%) 0.2 (1%) 0 (0%) 1.0 (7%) 
Water Supply; Sewerage, Waste 
Management and Remediation 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0.4 (2%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Construction -0.3 (-2%) 0.1 (1%) 0 (0%) -0.1 (-1%) -0.2 (-1%)  0.5 (4%) 
Wholesale and Retail Trade-cum-
Repair of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles 
4.1 (28%) 1.5 (6%)  0.7 (5%) 1.8 (13%) 2.8 (21%) 4.4 (33%) 
Transportation and Storage -0.4 (-3%) 0.2 (1%) 0.2 (1%) 0.5 (4%) 0.5 (4%) -0.5 (-4%) 
Accommodation and Food Service 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.1 (1%) 
Information and Communication 0.2 (1%) 0 (0%) 0.2 (1%) 0.2 (1%) 0.2 (1%) 0.5 (3%) 
Financial and Insurance Activities 5.9 (40%) 8.2 (33%) 4.3 (33%) 2.3 (17%) 1.6 (11%) -2.3 (-17%) 
Real Estate Activities 0.4 (3%) 0.4 (1%) 0.4 (3%) 0.1 (1%) 0.5 (4%) 0.9 (6%) 
Professional, Scientific and 
Technical Activities 
0.1 (1%) 0.2 (1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.1 (1%) 
Administrative and Support Service 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.1 (1%) 0.1 (1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Education 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Human Health and Social Work 
Activities 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.1 (1%) -0.3 (-2%)  0.1 (1%) 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Other Services Activities 1.0 (7%) 0.6 (2%) -0.7 (-5%) 0.1 (1%) 1.2 (9%) 1.8 (13%) 
Unspecified Activity 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.3 (3%) 0.2 (1%) 1.7 (12%) 0 (0%) 
Total 14.6 (100%) 24.7 (100%) 13.0 (100%) 13.3 (100%) 13.8 (100%) 13.4 (100%) 
Source: ASEANstats. 
 
To provide some historical context, Table 6 displays the stock of Japanese FDI in key 
ASEAN economies from 1990 to 2001. This was an important period following the endaka. 
Faced with a high business cost in Japan because of the JPY’s steep appreciation, many 
Japanese TNCs saw it fit to divide their production process into several sub-processes and 
locate each sub-process in another country where that particular process is carried out most 
efficiently. ASEAN’s then booming economy and proximity to Japan allowed the region to tap 
into this ready source of capital and technology. For Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, it is clear that the lion’s share of FDI has gone towards manufacturing. In particular, 
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as much as 75% and 73% of Japanese FDI has financed the manufacturing industries of 
Malaysia and the Philippines respectively. Within the manufacturing industries of these four 
ASEAN economies, a sizeable portion has gone towards electric machinery activities, except 
Indonesia where chemicals-related investment are the major attraction for Japanese TNCs. 
 
Table 6: Sector-by-Sector Analysis of Stock of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, 1990-2001 (Billion JPY, %) 
Sector Value (Sectoral Composition) 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines  Thailand 
Manufacturing 987 (52%) 659 (75%) 463 (73%) 1,012 (68%) 
- Food 18 (1%) 23 (3%) 75 (12%) 44 (3%) 
- Textiles 92 (5%) 12 (1%) 3 (1%) 53 (4%) 
- Wood and Pulp 45 (2%) 26 (3%) 3 (1%) 10 (1%) 
- Chemicals 388 (21%) 87 (10%) 28 (5%) 105 (7%) 
- Metal Products 112 (6%) 84 (10%) 42 (7%) 174 (12%) 
- General Machinery 19 (1%) 48 (5%) 34 (5%) 79 (5%) 
- Electric Machinery 112 (6%) 218 (25%) 172 (27%) 255 (17%) 
- Transport Machinery 126 (7%) 19 (2%) 74 (12%) 190 (13%) 
- Other Manufacturing 75 (4%) 142 (16%) 32 (5%) 102 (7%) 
Non-Manufacturing 896 (47%) 222 (25%) 167 (26%) 383 (26%) 
- Agriculture 1 (0) 1 (0) 2 (0) 7 (1) 
- Fishery 14 (1) 15 (2) 2 (0) 0 (0) 
- Mining 382 (20) 16 (2) 10 (2) 1 (0) 
- Construction 11 (1) 8 (1) 6 (1) 41 (3) 
- Commerce 13 (1) 19 (2) 7 (1) 105 (7) 
- Finance and Insurance 221 (12) 55 (6) 40 (6) 68 (5) 
- Services 120 (6) 62 (7) 34 (5) 45 (3) 
- Transportation 22 (1) 6 (1) 46 (7) 65 (4) 
- Real Estate 105 (6) 39 (4) 20 (3) 51 (3) 
- Other Non-Manufacturing 6 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 
Branches 10 (1) 3 (0) 8 (1) 99 (7) 
Total 1,893 (100) 884 (100) 638 (100) 1,494 (100) 
Source: Urata (2002). 
 
3. Discussion 
Overall, it is clear that Chinese FDI into ASEAN remains rather limited in both quantity 
and quality, with less impact than what is commonly portrayed in the popular media. Despite 
a rapid influx of FDI into the region in recent times, Chinese TNCs have not managed to 
dislodge the region’s traditional investors, namely ASEAN and Japan. The three most 
important markets for Chinese TNCs are Singapore, Indonesia, and Myanmar respectively – 
witnessed by the strong inward flow of Chinese FDI – but these three economies have also 
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continued to attract the investment dollars of ASEAN and Japanese TNCs, diluting the 
supposedly ‘influential’ presence of the Chinese. More specifically, barring the marginal 
market of Laos, Chinese investors thus far have not been able to command a leading position 
and to materially restructure ASEAN’s economy. If anything, Chinese capital has diversified 
the source of FDI in ASEAN, allowing several ASEAN member states to take on more 
adventurous or speculative projects that are not usually favoured by more mature investors 
such as the Western and Japanese TNCs.7 Although statistics related to the stock of FDI is not 
as easily retrieved, the evidences gathered here suggest an equally, if not more, pessimistic 
scenario for the Chinese TNCs. In Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, ASEAN and Japanese 
investors remain key players, outsizing the stock of Chinese FDI by a considerable margin.  
The qualitative aspect of Chinese FDI entering ASEAN tells a somewhat similar story. 
A significant portion of Chinese FDI has been directed to the tertiary sector, especially real 
estate development. While real estate development helps to partially bridge the housing needs 
of some of ASEAN’s rapidly urbanizing areas, it is of little use as many of these Chinese-
sponsored real estate projects have been designated as high-end enclaves that are not inclusive 
to the local constituents. Some of the more high profile examples include the aforementioned 
Forest City project in Johor, Malaysia.8 Forest City not only has been prized out of the reach 
of the local population, but also targets almost exclusively foreign buyers (in particular those 
from China). Worsening the situation is the revelation by the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
that there have been incidents of tax avoidance for some property purchases in Forest City 
(Dzulkifly 2018). The exclusive nature of this project has also been pointed out and repeatedly 
harped upon by Mahathir, both when he was actively campaigning as opposition leader and 
after he became Prime Minister in May 2018. If anything, Forest City became one of the 
lightning rods for which Mahathir channelled electoral anger towards for its perceived role in 
‘selling out’ Malaysian interest to Chinese investors (see Liu and Lim 2019).  
 
                                                          
7 Some of the more notorious cases in recent times include the Bandar Malaysia project, which was 
backed by former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak. The project has since been halted and key 
people linked to the project are under investigation, including Najib, for alleged abuse of power (BBC 
2019). 
8 Forest City – conceptualized as a luxury-style mixed use development sprawled over four manmade 
islands – is situated in the west of Johor. With a projected total investment of USD 58.0 billion, Forest 
City was conceptualized in 2013 and is envisioned to house 700,000 people over the next 20 years. It 
is driven by Country Garden, a private property developer through a 60/40 joint venture with Esplanade 
Danga 88 Private Limited, a Malaysian firm (Ng and Lim 2017). 
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There is also a striking difference between the characteristics of contemporary Chinese 
investment with that of Japanese investment (of the current era as well as of the endaka). The 
Japanese TNCs have invested primarily into ASEAN’s manufacturing industries during the 
endaka and have continued to consolidate their dominance ever since (see Tables 5 and 6). 
Japan’s experience in investing into ASEAN can perhaps offer some lessons for Chinese TNCs 
keen to establish a more sustainable impact in the region, a topic that will be revisited in the 
subsequent paragraph.  
The analysis thus far illustrates that Chinese FDI into ASEAN remains limited in both 
quantity and quality. Without going into more details on the actual performance of Chinese 
FDI in the region, this paper suggests a few pointers for researchers who are keen to conduct 
more finely-grained studies on this topic. Firstly, there seems to be a correlation between the 
sustainability of FDI and its quality. This is especially borne out in Japanese FDI into ASEAN. 
As Tables 5 and 6 have demonstrated, a large portion of Japanese capital has gone towards 
manufacturing. Manufacturing, courtesy of its value chain linkages to the domestic and 
regional economies, is bound to generate more long-lasting and widespread impacts than 
investment related to the tertiary sector. Another positive aspect of manufacturing-related FDI 
is its incremental impact on productivity gains. Relative to other forms of activities, 
manufacturing is better-positioned to promote progressive skills upgrading and efficiency gains. 
A good illustration of the benefit of manufacturing-related FDI is seen in the case of Thailand. 
The Kingdom has continued to build up its stock of Japanese FDI, although Japanese 
investment into ASEAN as a whole has been kept at a fairly subdued level from 2013 to 2017 
(see Figure 1 and Table 2). Two issues can perhaps explain Thailand’s continued ability to 
attract Japanese TNCs – its status as ASEAN’s Japan-driven automobile hub and its ability to 
orchestrate the production network of Japanese TNCs in the Greater Mekong Subregion 
courtesy of its savviness in incorporating itself into Japan’s ‘Thailand-Plus-One’ strategy.  
Secondly, Chinese TNCs are latecomers to the region, establishing their presence only 
in the 2000s. In addition to their acute lack of experience operating overseas, these Chinese 
TNCs have to overcome the ‘incumbency effect’ of the more established investors. This means 
that Chinese TNCs not only have to capture less explored markets, but also displace the 
presence and goodwill of the more experienced TNCs (from Japan or elsewhere). While the 
data in this paper paints a broad picture of a lack of Chinese success in altering ASEAN’s 
economy, there remains some instances where Chinese TNCs have carved out a niche for 
themselves. These cases are not easily captured by conventional statistical technique, but still 
worthy of more research attention as they potentially offer useful lessons for Chinese TNCs 
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wanting to more meaningfully deepen their production networks in ASEAN. Some of the more 
interesting cases are the consumer electronics and motorcycle manufacturing industries (Lim 
2017; Fujita 2013). 
Thirdly, this paper has not examined the impacts of investment from offshore business 
centres such as Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and the Cayman Islands. These business centres, 
courtesy of their open stance to international capital and relatively relaxed legislation, make 
them fairly significant players in the investment and commercial setting of some ASEAN 
economies. As such, there is a case to be made for a more comprehensive analysis on the flow 
and stock of FDI – originating from China or otherwise – entering and exiting these offshore 
destinations before eventually settling in ASEAN. Hong Kong’s proximity to China and the 
other major Northeast Asian economies (such as Japan and Korea) make it a particularly 
interesting (albeit technically challenging) case for further studies. 
  
4. Conclusion 
Analysing the investment of China into ASEAN, this paper has illustrated how Chinese 
FDI in ASEAN economies is less impactful than what popular rhetoric suggests. Although 
Chinese TNCs have rapidly increased their stock and flow of FDI in ASEAN, they have not 
dislodged the region’s traditional investors, not least Japan and ASEAN itself. Apart from Laos, 
Chinese TNCs have enjoyed only minimal success in the region. In addition, the quality of 
Chinese FDI is also lacking as much of it is directed towards (luxurious, speculative) real estate 
development that offer few positive linkages to the domestic population. Unlike Japan, China’s 
lack of investment towards the manufacturing industry brings about question marks regarding 
the sustainability of future Chinese FDI into ASEAN. The paper has also raised some useful 
pointers for future studies, namely the factors leading to continued FDI inflow to ASEAN, case 
studies of Chinese TNCs establishing a niche position in the regional marketplace (which are 
not easily captured by statistical data), and the need to better understand the role of offshore 
financial centres in orchestrating Chinese investment into ASEAN.  
What then are the policy implications of this paper? Like the wave of Japanese capital 
entering ASEAN in the past, Chinese FDI can bring about a huge opportunity for the region, 
but only if it is well-embedded to the regional and domestic industrial ecosystem. To this end, 
there exists ample opportunities for a trilateral cooperation between the TNCs from China, 
Japan, and ASEAN itself. Rather than viewing China’s entry as a threat or a zero-sum game, 
more can be done to combine the positive elements of the respective business systems of China, 
Japan, and ASEAN. For example, Chinese determination to complete projects in a short 
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timespan can be combined with Japanese-style monozukuri (manufacturing spirit) and ASEAN 
firms’ intimate knowledge of the local and regional market. Although tentative in nature, some 
prominent projects that are moving towards this form of trilateral collaboration are the high-
speed railway linking Thailand to Laos (see also Aiyara 2019).  Another avenue is for ASEAN 
policymakers to engage the region’s dialogue partners (not least Japan and China) in a more 
structured manner so that economic policies can be collectively coined and implemented. At 
least in the Greater Mekong Subregion, there is no outright grand development plan involving 
the ASEAN states and their dialogue partners. The traditional route involves the offering of a 
variety of options by the dialogue partners for particular ASEAN states to choose from, 
resulting in a ‘development bazaar’ that lacks synergistic value (Pitakdumrongkit 2019). These 
efforts deserve more encouragement and scholarly attention for they contribute to a meaningful 
interaction between three of Asia’s key economic bodies. 
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